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RECENT CASES
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-CIVIL CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO SUPPORT
-LIMITATION ON USE OF PENNSYLVANIA PROCEDURAL SUPPORT
LAW IN INCARCERATION OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS. Barrett v. Bar-
rett, -Pa.-, 368 A.2d 616 (1977).
In Barrett v. Barrett,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court construed
the Civil Procedural Support Law2 to condone a divorced father's volun-
tary relinquishment of employment and subsequent failure to support his
ex-wife and their three minor children. Muraco v. Pitulski,3 decided the
same day as Barrett,' raised substantially the same issues; factually,
however, the cases differ. 5 Nevertheless, the court reached the same
conclusion in each, reversing and remanding unanimous decisions of the
superior court6 that had upheld civil contempt decrees for failure to
comply with support orders.
Appellants raised two issues on appeal: first, whether an indigent
person who in the past has willfully disobeyed support orders can pres-
ently be imprisoned for civil contempt, even though he is unable to purge
himself of the contempt because of his indigency; second, whether it is a
violation of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution
to imprison an indigent for civil contempt, when his release is con-
ditioned on financial criteria, thus rendering the contemnor unable to
comply with the court's order. In both cases the court responded in the
negative to the first issue, declaring it unnecessary to address appellants'
second argument.
7
I. - Pa. -, 368 A.2d 616 (1977).
2. Act of July 13, 1953, P.L. 431, No. 95, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§
2043.31 et seq. (Purdon 1968).
3. - Pa. -, 368 A.2d 624 (1977).
4. The decisions in both cases were announced on January 28, 1977.
5. Pitulski accumulated arrearages of $7,184.00, on a support order fixing his weekly
obligation at twenty-five dollars for two minor children. In contrast to Barrett, Pitulski
testified that his unemployment was involuntary and that he had continuously sought
reemployment.
6. Muraco v. Pitulski, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 356 A.2d 816 (1976); Barrett v. Barrett,
237 Pa. Super. Ct. 590, 352 A.2d 74 (1975).
7. Barrett v. Barrett, - Pa. -, -, 368 A.2d 616, 619 (1977); Muraco v. Pitulski,
Pa.- , -, 368 A.2d 624, 625 (1977).
Section 9(b) of the Civil Procedural Support Law provides that
"[any wilful failure to comply with any order of the court may be
deemed a contempt . . . punishable by the court by commitment to the
county jail or house of correction. "8 In both Barrett9 and Muracol0 one
of the court's major concerns was identifying the contempt proceeding as
civil rather than criminal. " Generally, it is the purpose of the proceeding,
-to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, or to enforce
compliance with a court order-which determines the nature of the
contempt. 12
In Barrett, the court declared that the purpose of the Civil Proce-
dural Support Law "clearly is to provide a civil mechanism for effecting
compliance with the duty of support.' ' 3 It noted that the trial court had
imposed conditional sentences of imprisonment to coerce past and future
support payments for contemnor's children.14 The contempts, therefore,
were "clearly civil." 5 The superior court had likewise acknowledged the
proceedings as civil contempt.' 6 Nevertheless, the supreme court per-
ceived a fatal flaw in the superior court's rationale: the "Superior Court
confused the coercive and prospective function of imprisonment in civil
contempt with criminal punishment for past acts. ... 17 In fact, the
superior court had correctly and more reasonably construed the Civil
Procedural Support Law's prohibition against a "wilful failure to comply
with any order of the court. .... ,,8 Barrett had had a series of jobs, but
"seldom if ever voluntarily complied with either [support] order
.... ,,19 In March, 1974, he voluntarily terminated his full time em-
ployment alleging "harassment" by the mothers of his children and the
Beaver County Domestic Relations Office. In May, 1974, he went to
Ohio and, although employed there during his one year stay, he for-
8. PA. STAT. ANN tit. 62, § 2043.39(b) (Purdon 1968).
9. - Pa. -, 368 A.2d 616 (1977).
10. - Pa. , 368 A.2d 624 (1977).
II. For an excellent account of the distinctions between civil and criminal contempt
see Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 392 Pa. 500,
140 A.2d 814 (1958).
12. If the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court
and to protect the interest of the general public, it is a proceeding for criminal
contempt. But where the act of contempt complained of is the refusal to do or
refrain from doing some act ordered or prohibited primarily for the benefit of a
private party, proceedings to enforce compliance with the decree of the court are
civil in nature. The purpose of a civil contempt proceeding is remedial, and
judicial sanctions are employed (1) to coerce the defendant into compliance with
the court's order, and (2) in some instances to compensate the complainant for
losses sustained.
Knaus v. Knaus, 387 Pa. 370, 376-77, 127 A.2d 669, 672 (1956). See United States v. United
Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947).
13. Barrett v. Barrett, - Pa. -, -, 368 A.2d 616, 619 (1977) (emphasis added).
14. Id. at-, 368 A.2d at 619.
15. Id. at-, 368 A.2d at 619. Accord, Simmons v. Simmons, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 365,
335 A.2d 764 (1975).
16. See Barrett v. Barrett, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 590, 352 A.2d 74 (1975).
17. Barrett v. Barrett, - Pa. -, -, 368 A.2d 616, 620 (1977).
18. PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 62, § 2043.39(b) (Purdon 1968) (emphasis added).
19. Barrett v. Barrett, - Pa. - -, 368 A2d 616, 618 (1977).
warded no support to Pennsylvania. 20 There was no evidence that Barrett
attempted to find reemployment in Pennsylvania on his return.21 Judge
Price, writing for the superior court, stated:
[Barrett] was imprisoned for willfully violating court orders
with which he was fully capable of complying when the orders
were entered. The fact that appellant may be indigent at present
has no bearing on his failure to support his wife and children
when he was able. Were we to agree with appellant's belief that
no indigent may be imprisoned for civil contempt by willfully
failing to support his dependents, even though the indigency
was voluntarily created, the courts of the Commonwealth
would lose all power to enforce support orders. We will not so
hold.
22
In contrast, the supreme court did so hold, declaring that
[when] the contemnor presents evidence of his present inability
to comply and make up the arrears, the court, in imposing
coercive imprisonment for civil contempt, should set conditions
for purging the contempt and effecting release from imprison-
ment with which it is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt,
from the totality of the evidence before it, the contemnor has
the present ability to comply.
23
The practical effect of the supreme court's holding is that Pennsylvania
courts are powerless to coerce future compliance with support orders by
indigents who are in willful disobedience of those orders. This is an
unfortunate result because the support law was designed to promote such
coercion. 24
All courts recognize the defense of inability to pay in contempt
proceedings charging nonsupport.2 Procedurally, "[iln a contempt pro-
20. Originally a written agreement, later incorporated into a court order, provided for
fifty dollars per week for support of both Barrett's ex-wife and children. Five years after his
divorce, Barrett pleaded guilty to bastardy charges and was ordered to pay lying-in expenses
plus ten dollars weekly toward that child's support. By June, 1975, arrearages under the
court order were $16,263.78 and those under the criminal sentence totaled $2,363.83. Id. at
-, 368 A.2d at 618.
21. Barrett's total assets consisted of his clothing, a 1964 Oldsmobile worth twenty-
five dollars as junk and an unspecified account containing approximately seventy dollars.
There was no testimony regarding the value of a 1968 Ford registered in his name, but
allegedly the property of his current girlfriend. Id. at -, 368 A.2d at 622.
22. Barrett v. Barrett, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 590, 596, 352 A.2d 74, 77 (1975).
23. Barrett v. Barrett, - Pa.-, -, 368 A.2d 616, 621 (1977) (emphasis in original).
The court further stated that
to condition a person's avoidance of or release from imprisonment on his per-
forming acts beyond his power to perform is in effect to convert a coercive
sentence into a penal one without the safeguards of criminal procedure, we are of
the opinion that the stricter evidentiary standard of the criminal law should apply
with regard to the issue of present ability.
Id. at -, 368 A.2d at 621 (citations omitted).
Under such a test, the common pleas court clearly erred in requiring Barrett, an
indigent, to pay $500 in arrearages and to post $500 compliance bonds, since adherence with
such order was obviously beyond his financial ability.
24. Cf., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.39 (Purdon 1968).
25. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, - Colo.-, 551 P.2d 709(1976); Tobey v. Tobey,
165 Conn. 742, 345 A.2d 21 (1974); Flynn v. Flynn, 330 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
Taapken v. Taapken, 39 I11. App. 3d 785, 350 N.E.2d 794 (1976); Hembree v. Hembree, 208
Ky. 658, 271 S.W. 1100 (1925); Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 156 N.W.2d 212 (1968);
ceeding when the failure to pay has been established the husband has the
burden of proving that his failure has not been willful" ' 26 in addition to
proving that it was the result of inability. While the hallmark of civil
contempt sentencing is to afford the contemnor an opportunity to purge
himself of contempt, necessarily requiring court imposition of an assess-
ment or fine which defendant has the ability to meet, 27 nonsupport cases
do not uniformly find inability a conclusive defense.
In Redick v. Redick,2 8 a South Carolina case, an ex-wife appealed
from a family court decision that found it had no productive remedy to
enforce child support payments. Defendant was $2,056.00 in arrears on a
support order of fifty dollars per week for two minors. The court held on
appeal that by pleading the support order and establishing default, the
wife had made out a prima facie case of contempt, thereby placing the
burden on defendant to show his inability. The court noted defendant's
college background, his lack of physical incapacity, his minimum living
expenses (as he resided with his mother), and his $7,000.00 earnings over
a two year period. Defendant testified that he had little work, had never
contacted an employment agency and had applied for only two jobs.
"This failure by respondent to actively seek gainful employment was not
explained. "29 The appellate court therefore reversed and remanded the
family court's decision. In so doing they declared that South Carolina law
requires a father who is in possession of sufficient means, or "who is able
to earn such means is required to pay a reasonable sum for the support of
his minor children." 3" Clearly, under the reasoning of Redick, the appar-
ent present capability of appellant in Barrett to be a wage earner would
render him liable to provide reasonable support. Under the Redick
rationale it is also likely that the court could hold the defendant, who had
voluntarily terminated employment and never actively sought reemploy-
ment, in civil contempt under the applicable South Carolina statute.
31
If the goal of civil contempt procedures in cases of non-support is to
coerce compliance with an outstanding order (as it clearly is under the
Pennsylvania Civil Procedural Support Law) it seems only reasonable to
confine the defense of inability to pay to those who have not brought on
the inability by their own fault.32 This view has been adopted by many
Teehey v. Teehey, 533 S.W.2d 563 (Mo. 1976); Cain v. Cousar, 52 App. Div. 924, 383
N.Y.S.2d 402 (1976); Ex parte Dustman, 538 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. 1976).
26. Nastier v. Naster, 163 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. 1964).
27. Orders, decrees and sentences in civil contempt proceedings must state the condi-
tion which, when complied with, will purge the contemnor of his contempt; the prisoner thus
carries the keys to prison in his own pocket. In re Specter, 439 Pa. 404, 268 A.2d 104 (1970).
28. 266 S.C. 241, 222 S.E.2d 758 (1976).
29. Id. at -, 222 S.E.2d at 759.
30. Id. at -, 222 S.E.2d at 759.
31. S.C. CODE §§ 15-1228; 15-1225; 15-1095.24(3); 15-1095.25; 20-303.
32. "The inability of the defendant to obey an order of the court, without fault on his
part, is a good defense to a charge of contempt." Tobey v. Tobey, 165 Conn. 742, -, 345
A.2d 21, 24 (1974). Accord, Faircloth v. Faircloth, 321 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
A 1973 Pennsylvania case indicated that fault may well be a valid consideration in
courts. 33 For example, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate
Division, recently decided a case factually similar to Barrett on just these
grounds. 34 The lower court had found an ex-husband in willful violation
of a support order and committed him to thirty days of confinement.
Defendant had voluntarily left a job to accept a position of higher pay, but
after one week of work, was laid off. Thereafter, he received public
assistance for approximately six months, but due to his failure to reregis-
ter, assistance was terminated. Although he had been offered several
temporary positions through the employment office, defendant testified
that he could better use his time searching for full time employment.
Acknowledging that failure to pay of itself is not indicative of wilfullness,
subjecting the defendant to civil contempt, the appellate division
nevertheless found that the conduct here demonstrated wilful failure to
support.
35
Likewise, Hopp v. Hopp,36 decided by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in 1968, held that
confinement should not be directed to compel a party to do
something which he is wholly unable to do. But, the burden of
proving inability should be on the defendant, who should not be
held to have sustained it when he has failed to make a good-
faith effort to conform.
37
Similarly Florida places the burden on the defendant to prove both his
present inability to pay and that his inability is due to circumstances
beyond his control, which have intervened since the final decree ordering
him to pay, rather than his own fault or neglect.
38
finding wilful noncompliance under the Civil Procedural Support Law. Commonwealth ex
ret. Wright v. Hendrick, 455 Pa. 36, 312 A.2d 402 (1973). The facts therein did not, however,
require immediate resolution of the issue.
33. Tobey v. Tobey, 165 Conn. 742, 345 A.2d 21 (1974); Garo v. Garo, 327 So. 2d 845
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 113 II1. App. 2d 374, 252 N.E.2d 93 (1969);
Hembree v. Hembree, 208 Ky. 658, 271 S.W. 1100 (1925); Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170,
156 N.W.2d 212 (1968); Teehey v. Teehey, 533 S.W.2d 563 (Mo. 1976); State ex rel.
Houtchens v. District Ct., 122 Mont. 76, 199 P.2d 272 (1948); Wright v. Wright, 132 Neb.
619, 272 N.W. 568 (1937); Stacy v. Speanburg, - App. Div. 2d -, 385 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1976);
State v. McKee, 237 Or. 583, 392 P.2d 645 (1964); Bailey v. Bailey, 77 S.D. 546, 95 N.W.2d
533 (1959).
34. Stacy v. Speanburg, - App. Div. 2d -, 385 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1976).
35. Id. at -, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 876. A Montana decision articulated the vital distinction
between inability and willfulness:
Lack of ability to support one's wife and dependant offspring must not be
confused with lack of will to discharge such legal, moral and social obligation.
Little sympathy can be had for a husband and father who willfully fails and
refuses to support his family. The husband is not relieved of liability to comply
with the court's orders in that behalf merely because he has no property or
because he is not gainfully employed. His ability to perform labor; his opportunity
to find gainful employment; his disposition and will to earn money and contribute
a reasonable amount to his family's support, and his diligence in seeking employ-
ment that will yield, at the very least, sufficient wages to provide for himself and
dependents the necessaries of life should be also considered.
State ex rel. Houtchens v. District Ct., 122 Mont. 76, 82, 199 P.2d 272, 275 (1948).
36. 279 Minn. 170, 156 N.W.2d 212 (1968).
37. Id. at-, 156 N.W.2d at 217. See also, Cohen v. Mirviso Mfg. Co., 173 Minn. 100,
216 N.W. 606 (1927); Laff v. Laff, 161 Minn. 122, 200 N.W. 936 (1924).
38. Yandell v. Yandell, 33 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1948); Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 192 So. 466
(1939); Faircloth v. Faircloth, 321 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Naster v. Naster, 163
So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1964).
These decisions, along with those of several other jurisdictions,
39
recognize what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has apparently failed to;
that is, by permitting a voluntary indigent to rest on a defense of inability
when challenged for nonsupport in a civil contempt proceeding, the court
relinquishes all coercive abilities provided by the Civil Procedural Sup-
port Law.4 ° That law prohibits "wilful failure to comply" with support
orders, a provision that literally and reasonably should be interpreted to
preclude a defendant's purposeful relinquishment of employment in order
to avoid his duty to support. The Barrett decision4' runs directly counter
to this result by adopting inability to pay as an absolute defense to
contempt proceedings brought to enforce support orders. 42 Concomi-
tantly, contrary to the weight of authority, 43 the Barrett court relieves the
defendant of the burden of showing a lack of intentional, contumacious
effort to render himself unable to comply with the support order.
If, under Barrett, a court cannot coerce a voluntary indigent to
future compliance through incarceration, what remedies remain for ef-
fecting support? The Pennsylvania Crimes Code"4 makes failure to sup-
port a misdemeanor.45 Nevertheless, because all procedural safeguards of
criminal proceedings must be afforded the defendant, this method of
support order enforcement is both time consuming and costly. Conse-
quently, the statute is infrequently utilized. Moreover, in a case such as
Barrett, the statute would provide only temporary punishment. Thus,
unlike the civil contempt proceeding, the criminal remedy for nonsupport
does not tend to further the goal of collecting arrearages or compelling
future performance.
A possible alternative to imposing financial conditions to be met by
a contemnor in order to purge himself of the contempt for nonsupport,
and to free himself from incarceration, is establishing county-based
work-release programs. Under such programs, an indigent would be
assigned employment by court order and be compelled to pay support
from his earnings. This way, courts would not be imposing financial
conditions on the indigent, by definition unable to meet them, as con-
demned in Barrett." Instead, the court would mandate that contemnor
work at a job made available by the court, thereby assisting defendant in
becoming financially able. Such programs, however, would require fi-
nancial outlays and manpower not necessarily available to all counties in
the Commonwealth. Furthermore, such programs raise constitutional
questions. Several jurisdictions, by way of dicta, have stated that a court
may not compel an individual to seek or retain a particular job in an effort
39. See note 33 supra.
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.39 (Purdon 1968).
41. - Pa. -, 368 A.2d 616 (1977).
42. Compare this view with that of State ex rel. Houtchens v. District Ct., 122 Mont.
76, 199 P.2d 272 (1948), quoted at note 35 supra.
43. See note 33 supra.
44. 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. §§ 101 et seq.
45. 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 4321.
46. - Pa. -, 368 A.2d 616 (1977).
to procure support.47 To hold otherwise would substitute the court's
knowledge and business judgment for the individual's.4 8 Therefore, while
such a program could be an effective method of enforcing dependants'
rights in collection of support past-due, its validity as a means of ensuring
future payments, or part of an on-going order of employment, is question-
able. Whether an indigent's challenge to a work-release program, incor-
porated into contempt procedures under Pennsylvania's Civil Procedural
Support Law, 49 would be upheld by the Barrett court is difficult to
predict: that a good argument could be presented on the indigent's behalf
is, nevertheless, clear.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court by its decision in Barrett v.
Barrett,5" has forced the Commonwealth's support law into an impotent
posture. Only when a court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it
is within a defendant's ability to purge himself of civil contempt can
coercive sanctions and confinement be ordered. 5 1 A defense of inability
to pay, even though purposely induced, absolves a defendant of civil
contempt since absolute indigence means that any financial condition the
court could impose would be beyond his ability. Whether forced employ-
ment, the only coercive option reasonably left open to the courts by
Barrett, will be upheld, must await decision in a later case. In any event,
by the court's most recent construction of Pennsylvania's Civil Proce-
dural Support Law, 52 voluntary indigents have won an unwarranted
upper-hand in the Commonwealth's never ending support battle.
ADOPTION-EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT-PENNSYLVANIA LAW PER-
MITTING ADOPTION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD WITHOUT CONSENT OF
UNWED FATHER HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Adoption of Walker, --
Pa. -, 360 A.2d 603 (1976).
In Adoption of Walker' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared
unconstitutional the portion of section 411 of the Adoption Act2 which
required only the consent of the mother for the adoption of an illegitimate
child. The court declared that section 411 created an impermissible
47. E.g., Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 156 N.W.2d 212 (1968).
48. Id. at -, 156 N.W.2d at 217.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.39 (Purdon 1968).
50. - Pa. -, 368 A.2d 616 (1977).
51. Id. at-, 368 A.2d at 621.
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.39(b) (Purdon 1968).
[Casenote by Judith A. Lytle]
I. - Pa. -, 360 A.2d 603 (1976).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411(3) (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
In the case of an illegitimate child, the consent of the mother only shall be
necessary. The consent of the natural father of a child who was illegitimate at
birth shall be required only if the relationship between mother and child was
to procure support.47 To hold otherwise would substitute the court's
knowledge and business judgment for the individual's.4 8 Therefore, while
such a program could be an effective method of enforcing dependants'
rights in collection of support past-due, its validity as a means of ensuring
future payments, or part of an on-going order of employment, is question-
able. Whether an indigent's challenge to a work-release program, incor-
porated into contempt procedures under Pennsylvania's Civil Procedural
Support Law, 49 would be upheld by the Barrett court is difficult to
predict: that a good argument could be presented on the indigent's behalf
is, nevertheless, clear.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court by its decision in Barrett v.
Barrett,5" has forced the Commonwealth's support law into an impotent
posture. Only when a court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it
is within a defendant's ability to purge himself of civil contempt can
coercive sanctions and confinement be ordered. 5 1 A defense of inability
to pay, even though purposely induced, absolves a defendant of civil
contempt since absolute indigence means that any financial condition the
court could impose would be beyond his ability. Whether forced employ-
ment, the only coercive option reasonably left open to the courts by
Barrett, will be upheld, must await decision in a later case. In any event,
by the court's most recent construction of Pennsylvania's Civil Proce-
dural Support Law, 52 voluntary indigents have won an unwarranted
upper-hand in the Commonwealth's never ending support battle.
ADOPTION-EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT-PENNSYLVANIA LAW PER-
MITTING ADOPTION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD WITHOUT CONSENT OF
UNWED FATHER HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Adoption of Walker, --
Pa. -, 360 A.2d 603 (1976).
In Adoption of Walker' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared
unconstitutional the portion of section 411 of the Adoption Act2 which
required only the consent of the mother for the adoption of an illegitimate
child. The court declared that section 411 created an impermissible
47. E.g., Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 156 N.W.2d 212 (1968).
48. Id. at -, 156 N.W.2d at 217.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.39 (Purdon 1968).
50. - Pa. -, 368 A.2d 616 (1977).
51. Id. at-, 368 A.2d at 621.
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.39(b) (Purdon 1968).
[Casenote by Judith A. Lytle]
I. - Pa. -, 360 A.2d 603 (1976).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411(3) (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
In the case of an illegitimate child, the consent of the mother only shall be
necessary. The consent of the natural father of a child who was illegitimate at
birth shall be required only if the relationship between mother and child was
distinction between unwed fathers 3 and unwed mothers, and, therefore,
violated the Equal Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution.4
The court noted specifically that notice 5 to an unwed father of an adoption
proceeding is not sufficient to terminate his parental rights without his
consent because it is not sufficient to terminate an unwed mother's rights.
Citing Stanley v. Illinois,6 the Walker court opined that "[flederal
constitutional law required the same result." 7 Additionally, the court held
that mailed notice of proceedings implies a good-faith effort to discover
the intended recipient's current address, and absent that effort the notice
is not effective.
8
Walker is an appeal from the discharge of a rule to show cause why
an adoption should not be reversed. Appellant Robert Lee Walker is the
uncontested biological father of an illegitimate child born in 1970 while
he was living with the child's mother. After the parents separated in
1972, appellant made all payments pursuant to a support agreement and
fully exercised court-ordered weekly visitation rights. In November 1973
the mother of appellant's child married, and in May 1974 her husband,
with her joinder, filed a petition to adopt the child. The court ordered that
notice of the adoption hearing be mailed to appellant. 9 Notice was sent on
May 9, 1974, to an address appellant had previously supplied to the
Domestic Relations Division of Dauphin County, but was returned with
the marking "Moved, left no address." No further attempt was made to
notify appellant of the adoption proceeding although he visited the child
twice between May 9 and the May 23 adoption hearing. At the hearing no
evidence was presented to support termination of appellant's parental
rights, and on June 4, 1974, a decree of adoption was entered. Appellant
was informed of the adoption on June 8, 1974, by the child's mother,
who handed him a copy of the decree when he arrived for his regular
weekly visit. 0
Appellant filed an application for a rule to show cause why the
adoption should not be reversed and filed a petition to reopen the decree
of adoption. The orphans' court discharged the rule to show cause, and
appellant appealed directly to the supreme court challenging both the
terminated by a decree entered after the marriage of the mother and the natural
father.
3. The term "unwed father" is used to designate the father of an illegitimate child
regardless of the father's marital status.
4. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 (hereinafter cited as ERA): "Equality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the
sex of the individual."
5. -Pa. at -, 360 A.2d at 606.
6. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
7. - Pa. at - n. ll, 360 A.2d at 606 n. 11.
8. - Pa. at -, 360 A.2d at 607.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. I, § 421 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77): "Notice [of a hearing in an
adoption] shall be given to all persons whose required consent has not been obtained and to
such other persons as the court shall direct."
10. -Pa. at - 360 A.2d at 604.
constitutionality of the Adoption Act" and the adequacy of the attempt to
serve notice on him.
Walker is the first case decided by a court of last resort to test
whether an adoption law that discriminates against unwed fathers is
constitutional under a state equal rights amendment. It thus forms part of
the multi-jurisdictional judicial and legislative reevaluation of the unwed
father's role in adoption initiated by the Supreme Court's 1972 decision
in Stanley v. Illinois.'
2
In Walker the court read the Pennsylvania ERA 3 literally, finding
that because"[t]he only differences between unwed fathers and unwed
mothers are those based on sex . . . the offending [portion of the
Adoption Act]' 4 must be struck down.' '15 Thus if under the Act either
consent of the unwed mother or involuntary termination of her parental
rights is required for adoption of an illegitimate child, then either consent
or involuntary termination of parental rights of the unwed father must
also be required. This strict interpretation is consistent with previous
interpretations of the ERA by the supreme court. 16 Under this approach
there is no weighing of possible countervailing interests but merely an
analysis of a man's rights vis-a-vis a woman's rights with regard to their
child. '1 The interests and rights of the subject of the suit-the child whose
adoption is ultimately in the balance-are presumably irrelevant. 18 This
I1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 101-603 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
12. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For a concise summary of the law since Stanley, see Note,
61 CORNELL L. REV. 312, 312-16 (1976), especially 315 nn.13, 14, 15 (judicial response to
Stanley); 316 n.16 (statutory response to Stanley).
13. PA. CONsT, art. I, § 28.
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
15. - Pa. at -, 360 A.2d at 606.
16. See, e.g., DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974); Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d
139 (1974); Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
The swift movement toward equality that is provided by the absolutist model [of
interpreting the ERA] may have great symbolic significance. Nevertheless, the
absolutist approach ignores societal nuances, lacks flexibility, and is incapable of
anticipating problems. Thus it may create difficulties leading to unnecessary
dislocation of the social structure.
Beck, Equal Rights Amendment: The Pennsylvania Experience, 81 DICK. L. Rv 395 (1977);
cf., Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not The Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 234
(1971) (criticism of strict interpretation of the ERA).
17. For an historical overview of a biological parent's legal rights in his or her child,
see Ketcham & Babcock, Statutory Standards for the Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, 29 RUT. L. REV. 530, 532 (1976).
18. In fact, the interests of the child and of the state in protecting the welfare of the
child were never briefed to the court in Walker. Appellee argued only that the constitution-
ality of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 101-603 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77) [Adoption Act] could not be
raised because of appellants' failure to give notice to the Attorney General as required by
PA. R. Civ. P. 235. Brief for Appellee at 6, 7 Adoption of Walker, - Pa. -, 360 A.2d 603
(1976). The Attorney General did not submit a brief.
The court evidently did not entertain appellee's argument and decided the constitution-
ality of the Adoption Act essentially without argument in its behalf. Cf. Wiegand v.
Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 483, 337 A.2d 256, 257 (1975) (criticism of the "disposition of...
statutes [when] the attorney general is denied the opportunity of appearing and responding
to the constitutional challenge").
conception of the child's interests as irrelevant 9 conforms to a prevalent
theme in Pennsylvania adoption cases. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has declared, for instance, that "the welfare of the child and the appel-
lant's fitness as a parent have no relationship to the issue of abandonment
in adoption proceedings. 20
Two jurisdictions have propounded more liberal interpretations of
their respective ERA's, analogizing them to fourteenth amendment equal
protection rights with the implication that sex should be declared a
suspect classification. 2' Under this approach the state's legitimate interest
in the adoption process, and in children who are the subject of adoptions,
becomes relevant. It should be noted that this "equal protection" applica-
tion of the ERA is distinctly a minority view.
The Walker court concluded that federal constitutional law would
also invalidate section 411 of the Adoption Act. 22 This holding was
grounded on Stanley v. Illinois ,23 in which the Supreme Court found that
an unwed father had been denied due process and equal protecton when
he was not treated equally with other parents whose custody of a child is
challenged. Stanley was not concerned with notice of termination of
parental rights or with consent for adoption, but rather with an unwed
father's right to notice of a hearing to determine the custody of "the
children he has sired and raised." 24 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
19. This approach parallels the approach of the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972). Since Stanley, however, the Court has increasingly recognized the
interests of the child when considering the rights of unwed fathers in adoption cases. See In
re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976); Rothstein v. Lutheran Social
Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972) (mem.). See notes 25-27 and accompanying text infra.
20. Sheaffer Appeal [In re Baby Boy (Robbie)], 452 Pa. 165, 168, 305 A.2d 36 at
38-39 (1973). Cf. In re Watson, 450 Pa. 579, 301 A.2d 861 (1973), in which the court denied
the mother's petition to vacate a 1969 decree of voluntary relinquishment but remanded the
case to consider the impact of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), because the unwed
father's rights had not been terminated. The court evidently considered it irrelevant that the
child was already five years old and had been living with his prospective adoptive parents
for 4 1.2 years. See also Sarver Adoption Case, 444 Pa. 507, 281 A.2d 890 (1971); Schwab
Adoption Case, 355 Pa. 534, 50 A.2d 504 (1947).
21. Brooks v. State, 24 Md. App. 334, 330 A.2d 670 (1975); Finley v. State, 527
S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Both of these cases held that rape statutes were valid
under ERA's even though they set up classifications based on sex. In Finley the court,
articulating a standard for an ERA analysis, said: "The statute thus sets up a classification
on the basis of sex and we must determine if that classification is rationally related to the
furthering of a legitimate state interest." Id. at 555.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. I, § 411 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77). Cf. Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d
1067 (9th Cir. 1974) (portions of Oregon Adoption Statute that discriminated between unwed
mothers and unwed fathers declared null and void).
23. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Walker court quoted the Supreme Court in Stanley, id. at
649, as follows:
[A]s a matter of due process of law, [an unmarried father] was entitled to a
hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and
that, by denying [an unwed father] a hearing and extending it to all other parents
whose custody of their children is challenged, the State denied [the unwed father]
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
- Pa. at - n.ll, 360 A.2d at 606 n.II (brackets in original).
24. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Although never married, Stanley had
lived intermittently with his three children and their mother for eighteen years.
subsequently remanded an adoption case for reconsideration in light of
Stanley ,25 suggesting that Stanley does extend to adoption proceedings.
In remanding that case the Court directed that Stanley should be applied
with particular concern for the interests of the child. 26 This explicit
concern for the child marks the beginning of a shift in emphasis away
from the approach in Stanley, in which the court dealt almost exclusively
with the father's rights in his child and virtually excluded considering the
best interests of the child. This shift has continued in the Supreme Court's
recent dismissal "for want of a substantial federal question" of In re
Malpica-Orsini ,27 a very narrow reading of Stanley that stressed the
welfare of the child. This emphasis upon the welfare of the child is in
marked contrast to the approach taken in Walker.28 Dismissal of Mal-
pica-Orsini on stated grounds was a ruling on the merits and therefore
must be treated as an affirmance of the state court's holding. 29 The
question, then, is the surviving strength of Stanley after Malpica-Orsini
with respect to the unwed father's rights in the adoption of his child.
In Malpica-Orsini3° the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality31 of the section of the New York Domestic Relations
Law32 that requires the consent of all surviving parents before adoption of
a child, with the exception of the father of a child born out of wedlock,
whose consent is not required. The court discussed the welfare of the
child at great length, finding it to be of primary importance in formulating
adoption policy,33 and concluded that the legislature had adequate reason
to support its determination that the father of an illegitimate child should
25. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972)(mem.).
26. Id. at 1051. Rothstein involved the adoption of a two-week-old illegitimate child in
Wisconsin who was four years old by the time the case came before the Supreme Court.
State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 422, 178 N.W.2d 56, 57
(1970). The Court remanded "for further consideration in light of Stanley v. Illinois ... and
with due consideration for the completion of adoption proceedings and the fact that the child
has apparently lived with the adoptive family for the intervening period of time." Id.
Contra, In re Watson, 450 Pa. 579, 301 A.2d 861 (1973). See note 20 supra.
27. 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976). The Supreme Court's dismissal was handed
down on January 12, 1976; Walker was decided on July 6, 1976.
28. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
29. Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 179 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.
Pa. 1959), appeal dismissed, 273 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 961 (1960),
aff'd, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961) (Supreme Court dismissal
of an appeal of right from a state court for want of a substantial federal question is a ruling
on the merits of the question by the state court). See also Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d
666 (2d Cir. 1974); Doe v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1973); Brotherhood of Mainte-
nance of Way Emp. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 248 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
30. 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975). For a discussion of the
Malpica-Orsini decision, see Note, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 312 (1976).
31. New York does not have an ERA in its state constitution. The case was decided on
the basis of federal consitutional law, i.e., due process and equal protection. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
32. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § I11, subds. 2, 3, 4 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) (subdivi-
sions renumbered l(b)-(d) effective Jan. 1, 1977).
33. In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.S.2d 568, 572-77, 331 N.E.2d 486, 489-92, 370
N.Y.S.2d 511, 515-19 (1975).
not be allowed to veto an adoption. 34 The court also held that in situations
such as Malpica-Orsini, in which the father was given notice of the
adoption proceeding and an opportunity to be heard on the matter of the
adoption, there was no constitutional infringement.
35
Given the striking similarity of Malpica-Orsini and Walker-their
factual situations, the adoption laws subjected to constitutional challenge,
and the closeness in time in which they were heard-it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court would have decided the federal constitutional question
differently. 36 Unfortunately there is no evidence in the Walker decision
that the dismissal of Malpica-Orsini was brought to the attention of the
court, and thus the Walker court concluded, perhaps erroneously, that
federal constitutional law would compel the striking down of section 411
of the Adoption Act.
37
With regard to the issue of adequacy of notice, the Walker court
found that "[slervice by mail at the last known address implies a good
faith effort to discover the correct address." 38 It is settled law that due
process demands due diligence to ensure that the means employed to give
notice be reasonably calculated to bring actual notice to the intended
recipient. 39 In Walker, appellee knew when the mailed notice was re-
34. Id. at 576, 331 N.E.2d at 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519:
The mere possibility of a presently existing right on the part of even some fathers,
or one that might be acquired at a later date, no matter how restrictive the group to
whom the right granted may be, is enough to discourage a wide range of prospec-
tive placements and adoptions.
35. Id. at 577, 331 N.E.2d at 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520:
Due process was not lacking here. Although this was an adoption proceeding,
appellant Orsini, having been given notice by court direction, the right to object
and a full hearing with representation by an attorney, was not deprived of due
process ....
36. In both In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511
(1975) and Adoption of Walker, - Pa. -, 360 A.2d 603 (1976), the mother and father were
living together when a child was born out of wedlock (1970); the parents separated and the
mother took custody of the child; a support agreement was entered into which included
visitation rights and the father did not contest paternity (1972); the mother married someone
other than the father (1973); the new husband petitioned to adopt the child and the court
ordered notice to the unwed father; the adoption was granted and the father appealed; the
highest court in the state ruled on the federal constitutionality of the state adoption law that
required only the mother's consent for adoption of an illegitimate child (see notes 2, 32
supra).
37. - Pa. at -, 360 A.2d at 606 n. 11. The federal constitutionality of PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. I, § 421 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77) which provides that "Notice [of a hearing on an
adoption] shall be given to all persons whose required consent has not been obtained and to
such other persons as the court shall direct," was however questionable. Interpretations of
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) vary considerably as to whether due process and
equal protection require notice to all or to only some unwed fathers, see note 12 supra, but
prior to Walker section 421 required notice to no unwed father.
38. - Pa. at -, 360 A.2d at 607.
39. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections. ...
But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due
process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing
the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.
turned that the address was incorrect, and could very easily have hand-
delivered the notice or ascertained appellant's current address when he
visited his child. Therefore, even if section 411' had been found con-
stitutional, this case would properly have been reversed and remanded
because of the failure to give effective notice as directed by the orphans'
court.
41
There are profound implications for the adoption process in the
Walker court's requiring consent, or in lieu of consent, involuntary
termination of parental rights42 of all unwed fathers before their children
can be adopted. 43 Immediately and adversely affected are those children
already living with prospective adoptive parents but without the unwed
father's consent for adoption. While the mother will have terminated her
parental rights to effect the adoption of her child, adoption by the only
parents the child may have ever known"4 cannot be decreed without the
father's consent. Pending the father's identification, notice and consent,
the child may indefinitely remain an illegitimate, may be precluded from
having a legal mother, and may also be vulnerable to custody battles."
Further, it is not clear whether this decision affects existing adoptions that
were completed without termination of the unwed father's rights.
46
Id. at 314-15. Accord, Covey v. Somers, 351 U.S. 141 at 146 (1955) (quoting Mullane). See
also I STANDARD PA. PRACTICE 541 § 96 (1960); 2 GOODRICH-AMRAM, STANDARD PA.
Practice § 2080-10 (1954).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
41. - Pa. at -, 360 A.2d at 604.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 414 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
When parental rights have not previously been terminated, the court may find that
consent of a parent of the adoptee is not required if, after hearing as prescribed in
section 313, the court finds that grounds exist for involuntary termination under
section 311.
43. See Brief for the Child Care Association of Illinois, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 2,
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972):
The complex of laws which make possible the present-day custodial and
adoption system of child care could be inadvertently dealt a fatal blow. . . . If
the so-called 'unwed father' is to be automatically accorded . . . the right to
consent to the custody and/or adoption of the child . . . the whole legal system
for the adoption of children, which has proved so beneficial to society as a whole,
will be placed in serious jeopardy by the elements of delay and non-finality which
will thereby be interjected into the underlying judicial process.
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger observed that denying the difference between
unwed fathers and unwed mothers "embarks on a novel concept of the natural law for
unwed fathers that could well have strange boundaries as yet undiscernible." Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 at 668 (1972).
44. For general discussion of the importance of the 'psychological' parent, see J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
45. For sociological authority supporting the proposition that removal from the person
a child regards as a "parent" (regardless of legal status) may result in "considerable
emotional harm," see Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes
Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 158, 161 (1963). For adverse effects on the child
caused by delay and uncertainty, see Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination
of Parental Rights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q. 527 at 542 (1975); Littner,
Discussion of a Program of Adoptive Placement for Infants under 3 Months, 26 AMER. J. OF
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 577 (1956); Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After
Stanley v. Illinois; Problems in Implementation, 13 FAM. LAW 115 at 120-21 (1973-74).
46. See, e.g., In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 573-74, 331 N.E.2d 486, 490, 370
N.Y.S.2d 511, 517 (1975).
The unwed father in Walker was unequivocally identified, was
supporting the child, and had established a familial relationship with his
child.47 This is not the case with all or even most unwed fathers. The
identity of many unwed fathers is unknown4" because it is unknown to the
mother or because she refuses to reveal it. Notice by publication is not
likely to reach unknown unwed fathers; rather it will result in delays in
adoption and in adverse publicity for women who in the past had been
assured of strict confidentiality in adoption proceedings.4 9 If publication
fails, it is not clear under what circumstances a person's parental rights
can be involuntarily terminated before that person is even aware he is a
parent.
Even if identified, many unwed fathers are disinterested parties with
regard to their children.5" In terms of the child's welfare, as a matter of
public policy, it is questionable whether any person who has failed to
establish a legal, financial or social relationship with a child should be
given a veto over that child's future. 51 In Pennsylvania, involuntary
termination is not the answer because statutory requirements make the
procedure necessarily time consuming.52 Furthermore the courts have
We should be mindful of the jeopardy to which existing adoptions would be
subjected and the resulting chaos by an unadulterated declaration of unconstitu-
tionality. Even if there be a holding of non-retroactivity, the welfare of children,
placed in homes months ago, or longer, and awaiting the institution or completion
of legal proceedings, would be seriously affected. The attendant trauma is un-
pleasant to envision.
See also In re Watson, 450 Pa. 579, 301 A.2d 861 (1973): Cf. Hildenbrand Appeal, 405 Pa.
579, 582, 176 A.2d 900, 901 (1962) (importance of finality in decision to relinquish).
47. The unwed fathers in Walker and in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) are
alike in these respects.
48. Letter from Children's Aid Society of Pennsylvania to Marguerite G. Petty,
Dickinson School of Law (Oct. I1, 1976): "A rough estimate of the number of infants
[placed for adoption] for whom the father's identity and whereabouts are unknown or the
mother is unwilling to name him would be 50-60%."
49. See generally Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father & Termination of Parental
Rights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q. 527 (1975); Comment, Rights of
Putative Fathers in Custody and Adoption Proceedings-Washington's Law in Perspective,
9 GONZAGA L. REV. 826 at 834-39 (1974).
50. E.g., Brief for the Child Care Association of Illinois, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 1I,
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972):
[T]he past public experience upon which the Illinois legislation is based is, beyond
peradventure, that the vast majority of natural fathers are not only disinterested
in their illegitimate offspring but, in fact, affirmatively try to avoid any 'involve-
ment' in the birth and rearing of the child. That this is the universal experience is
attested to by the time-honored existence of paternity suits in every jurisdiction.
51. See Ex rel. K., 535 S.W.2d 168 (Texas 1976).
There is a rational basis for the state, which has an interest in securing stable
homes and supportive families for children, to distinguish between the father who
has accepted the legal and moral commitment to the family and the father who has
not done so. The biological father may be a sperm donor or a rapist or someone
• . . who has simply engaged in a single hit and run sexual adventure. He may, on
the other hand, be devoted to child and family even though the legal contract has
not been sealed.
Id. at 171.
52. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated . . . on the
ground that:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months
either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child, or
has refused or failed to perform parental duties; or
applied a very strict interpretation to these requirements.53 Under these
circumstances an unwed mother might be encouraged to commit fraud by
naming a cooperative third party as the father, to utilize the adoption
black market, 54 to abort a pregnancy (because abortion does not require
the unwed father's consent),55 to keep a baby she cannot care for rather
than risk revelation of the father's identity or the possibility of his gaining
control of the baby,5 6 or perhaps to take her baby out of Pennsylvania's
jurisdiction before placing it for adoption.
Analysis of the Walker decision reveals two strong and conflicting
social policies. There is a constitutional duty to treat unwed fathers and
unwed mothers equally with regard to the termination of their parental
rights, and there is a need for a statutory structure that will assure the
maintenance of a workable adoption program. These policies can perhaps
be reconciled by legislation limiting the consent requirement to those
unwed parents of children who are unequivocally identified as parents
and who have established a legal, financial or social relationship with
their children. Inevitably, because biology dictates that the mother, re-
gardless of her marital state, will almost certainly be identified as a
parent, such legislation will as a practical matter penalize unwed fathers.
Whether it could withstand a constitutional test under the Pennsylvania
ERA is questionable.
In Walker the court said that because the ERA forbids discrimina-
tion against unwed fathers vis-a-vis unwed mothers, each must be granted
the same rights in the adoption of their children. Without distinguishing
In re Malpica-Orsini, the court questionably concluded that federal
constitutional law would require the same result. Because of the severe
and detrimental effect this decision may have on the maintenance of a
practicable adoption program in Pennsylvania, a legitimate state interest,
there is an immediate need for remedial legislation.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of the
parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control, or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be remedied
by the parent . . . (Emphasis added.)
53. See Comment, Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights Under the Pennsyl-
vania Adoption Act, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 1050 (1975).
Despite the new statutory standards and language of the Adoption Act of 1970,
the court has to a great extent persisted in its policy of terminating parental rights
in only the most blatant instances of parental disinterest or neglect. While it is
understandable that the court wishes to move slowly in formulating an essentially
new area of law, the unfortunate result here is a refusal to free children for
adoption.
Id. at 1060. See also in re Adoption of M.T.T., - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 564 (1976). For suggested
guidelines for involuntary termination of parental rights, see Ketcham & Babcock, supra
note 17.
54. See In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 573, 331 N.E.2d 486, 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d
511, 516-17 (1975).
55. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976) (requiring
consent of anyone other than mother and doctor for abortion during first twelve weeks of
pregnancy is unconstitutional). See generally L. Roberson, Paternal Rights in the Decision to
Terminate a Pregnancy, 2 WOMEN's RIGHTs L. REP. 13 (1975).
56. See Cheryl Lynn H. v. Superior Ct., 115 Cal. Rptr. 849, 41 Cal. App. 3d 273 (Ct.
App. 1974).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-A STATE'S POLICE POWER DOES NOT
ALLOW THE ALTERATION OF THE PAYMENT TERMS OF SHORT TERM
MUNICIPAL NOTES. Flushing National Bank v. Municipal Assistance
Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
Although municipal bankruptcies' have infrequently occurred, the
discovery, in the summer of 1975, that America's largest municipality
faced immediate insolvency created a justifiable fear that threatened the
future of general obligation notes. Unlike corporate obligations, general
municipal obligations are backed by a pledge of "full faith and credit." 2
Until the Supreme Court of New York, Special Term for New York
County, decided the case of Flushing National Bank v. Municipal Assist-
ance Corp. ,3 those four words described an investment as certain as the
need of individuals to band together into communities: if the obligor
failed to meet the financial demands of general obligation notes, the terms
of the obligation forced it to raise ad valorem taxes to any amount needed
to generate a monetary pool sufficient for the payment of the obligation.
Furthermore, the financial resources of the obligor were subject to prior-
ity application against the claims of the obligee. The potential harshness
of this rule, which seems to subordinate the immediate welfare of munici-
pal citizens to the niceties of high finance, actualized during the summer
of 1975. It then became clear that the city of New York lacked the fiscal
integrity to repay the principal 4.7 billion dollars of its outstanding
general obligation notes, 4 while continuing to provide basic municipal
services. The New York State Legislature did find the existing rule too
harsh and realigned the priorities by enacting the New York City
Emergency Moratorium Act (EMA).
5
This note will examine the provisions of that Act, the three Flushing
National Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp. decisions, 6 and the logical
1. For the purposes of this note, the term "municipal bankruptcies" will describe
any financial circumstance under which a municipality is unable to repay unsecured obliga-
tions when due, while providing basic municipal services such as health, fire and police
protection. It will include situations normally defined as receiverships.
2. Under such conditions the bonds are considered the "direct, general or absolute
obligations of the municipal corporation to the extent that the debt limitation is not ex-
ceeded, and the municipality is regarded as being directly liable on the bonds." 64 C.J.S.
Municipal Corporations § 1957 (1950) (footnotes omitted).
3 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1975).
4. Id. at-, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 981.
5. 1975 New York Laws, Ex. Sess., c. 874, §§ 1-4.
6. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978
(1975) (hereinafter referred to in notes and text as "Flushing One"); Flushing Nat'l Bank v.
Mun. Assistance Corp., 52 App. Div. 2d 84,382 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1976) (hereinafter referred to
in notes and text as "Flushing Two"); Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 40
N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976) (hereinafter referred to in notes and
text as "Flushing Three").
inconsistencies inherent in the holding of the New York Court of Appeals
in the third Flushing Bank decision.
7
I. The Three Flushing Bank Decisions
A. The Emergency Moratorium Act
In June, 1975, the New York State Legislature created the Municipal
Assistance Corporation for the City of New York (MAC). 8 The corpora-
tion created thereby was the first legislative attempt to aid the im-
poverished city. MAC's powers included issuing state securities and
applying the proceeds toward strengthening the City's treasury. Within
two months, the legislators recognized the inadequacy of this initial effort
and enacted the controversial Emergency Moratorium Act.9
The Act affected all of the city's short term obligations, defined to
include all bond anticipation notes, revenue anticipation notes, tax antici-
pation notes, budget notes, and urban renewal notes outstanding on
November 14, 1975.10 Its impact was two-fold. First, it suspended all
actions on the affected obligations1' as well as the enforcement of all liens
and judgments on account of those obligations. 2 This moratorium pur-
ported to operate for three years despite the contrary demands of "any
[other] law"' 3 or "any agreement or short term obligation."1 4 Second,
the Act gave holders of the subject obligations an opportunity to exchange
their notes for an equal amount of MAC's own bonds. 15 Those bonds
would mature before or during 1986 and bear a six percent interest rate. 16
B. Flushing One
Flushing National Bank, a holder of original short term indebted-
ness, sued in the New York Supreme Court for New York County to
7. Flushing Three.
8. N.Y. Public Authority Law § 3033(A) (McKinney, 1975).
9. 1975 N.Y. Laws, Ex. Sess., c. 874, § I.
10. Flushing One, 84 Misc. 2d 976, -, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 981 (1975).
I1. 1975 N.Y. Laws, Ex. Sess., c. 874, § 2(4).
12. Id. at § 2(3).
13. Id. at § 2(3),(4).
14. Id. The drastic measures undertaken in enacting this legislation was justified by
the legislature's finding of a grave public emergency.
Today not only is the City of New York threatened with default on its outstanding
obligations but financially sound agencies of the state itself are similarly
threatened because of public fears about the effects of default by the city ...
There is . . .an imminent danger that the City of New York will be unable to pay
its outstanding short-term indebtedness and even to provide those basic services
essential to the health, safety and welfare of its inhabitants and the continuation
of orderly government in the city.
Id. at § 1.
15. Id. at § 2(5)(A). The Act further provided that six noteholders declining the
exchange could either accept newly issued City Repayment Notes in satisfaction of the
subject obligations, id. at § 2(6), or could retain those obligations and receive the declared
interest until the maturation date of the notes. Thereafter they would receive the greater of
either six percent or the rate provided by the newly issued City Repayment Notes. Id. at §
1(8). If the state failed to meet these obligations the suspension provisions of the Act would
become ineffective. Id. at § 1(5)(A),(B).
16. Id.
recover the principal amount of that indebtedness, attacking the validity
of the EMA. The bank alleged that the Act constituted a law impairing the
obligation of a contract, thus violating article 1, section 10 of the United
States Constitution; further, that the Act abrogated the pledge of "full
faith and credit" declared in the notes and required by article 8, section 2
of the New York State Constitution. 7 The court disagreed, upholding the
Act and dismissing the bank's complaint. 18
Analyzing the federal constitutional mandate against the impairment
of contracts, 19 the court decided that both state and federal courts "have
given priority to the public interest over strict compliance with the
contract clause." 20 The determination stood on three legs.
First, the nature of the contract clause is that of a limited or qualified
prohibition; its most stringent requirement is that no state impair a
contract unless it does so in the exercise of its police power. The court
adopted the words of the United States Supreme Court that the power of
police is "the sovereign right of the Government to protect the . . .
general welfare of the people." 2' The exercise of that power to impede
contractual obligations, therefore, is not per se violative of the
Constitution.22
The court next explained that when a state uses its police power to
modify contractual obligations, such modification is "impairment" in
name only. The contract itself gives the state the power to step between
the contractors and make any changes demanded by the public welfare; as
the state's positive law becomes an implied part of the contract 3 so does
its police power.
2 4
17. N.Y. CONST. art. 8, § 2 provides that
No indebtedness shall be contracted by any county, city, town, village or school
district unless such county, city, town, village or school district shall have pledged
its faith and credit for the payment of the principal thereof and the interest
thereon.
18. Flushing One, 84 Misc. 2d 976, -, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 987 (1975).
19. U.S. CONST. art. t, § 10 provides, inter alia, that "No state shall . . . pass any
• . . law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
20. Flushing One, 84 Misc. 2d 976, -, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 982 (1975).
21. Flushing One, 84 Misc. 2d 976, -, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 984 (1975), quoting East
New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945).
22. Flushing One, 84 Misc. 2d 976, -, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 982 (1975). See also East
New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1944):
Numerous decisions of [the] highest federal and state courts long ago repudiated
the notion . . . that the contract clause presents a rigid bar to the protection of
vital public interests, recognizing instead the power and indeed the duty of states
to prevent the enforcement of contractual terms in order to protect the health,
safety or welfare of their citizens.
23. See 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1374 (2d ed. 1962).
24. Flushing One, 84 Misc. 2d 976, -, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 983 (1975). See also
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 276 (1932) wherein the United States Supreme Court
held that a state's interference with contracts of highway carriers was justifiable:
Nor does it matter that the legislation has the result of modifying or abrogating
contracts already in effect. Such contracts are to be regarded as having been made
subject to the future exercise of the constitutional power of the state.
Accord, Faitoute Iron and Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 511-12 (1942).
The necessity compelled by unexpected financial conditions to modify an original
arrangement for discharging a city's debt is implied in every such obligation. . ..
Finally, the sovereign power of the state to interfere with contracts in
order to protect its citizens may be inalienable by the state to the federal
government. The Flushing One court does not go so far as to say that
even if the contract clause had required utter non-interference the state
could act as it saw fit. The court does, however, cite United States
Supreme Court authority for the proposition that the states retain the
fundamental power of sovereign protection despite their entry into a
republic.25
In a federated system of government, primary power resides in the
states. The national government exercises only the yielded powers of
sovereignty. 26 The Constitution contains no general alienation of the
states' duty to protect their citizenry, and "[it does not matter that
legislation appropriate to that end has the result of modifying or abrogat-
ing contracts already in effect." 27
Concerning the state law issue the court found that article 8, section
2 of the New York Constitution, which demands that a pledge of "faith
and credit" support all municipal obligations, furnished only "the means
for ultimate repayment" of those obligations. 28 Without explanation, the
court found that the Moratorium Act did not relieve the city of its pledge
of full faith and credit; rather the Act constituted a legislative recognition
that "[a] point is reached where . . . economic erosion" follows in-
creased taxation.
29
The intervention of the State in the fiscal affairs of its cities is plainly an exercise
of its essential reserve powers to protect the vital interests of its people by
sustaining the public credit and maintaining local government.
25. Flushing One, 84 Misc. 2d 976, -, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 983-84 (1975), citing East
New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33 (1944):
The formal mode of reasoning by means of which 'protective power of the
State,' . . . is acknowledged is of little moment. . . . Once we are in this
domain of the reserve power of a State we must respect the 'wide discretion of the
fact of a legislature in determining what is and what is not necessary'. . .. So far
as the constitutional issue is concerned, 'the power of the state when otherwise
justified; is not diminished because a private contract may be affected.'
26. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958).
The essence of a constitutionally formulated federalism is the division of
political and legal powers between two systems of government constituting a
single nation. . . .It is relevant to remind that our Constitution is one of particu-
lar powers given to the National Government with the powers not so delegated
reserved to the states or, in the case of limitations upon both governments, to the
people.
27. Flushing One, 84 Misc. 2d 976, -, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 982-83 (1975).
28. Those "means" include the imposition of city taxes but only within "reasonable"
limits. Flushing One, 84 Misc. 2d 976, -, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 985 (1975).
29. Id. The plaintiff bank also argued the invalidity of the Moratorium Act as a
violation of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 83(i) in that the Moratorium Act constituted a
state law "prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness" that became binding upon
creditors. Further, the bank contended that the Moratorium Act violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because it
affected only "city notes" and not "city bonds." The court dismissed both contentions,
declaring that since both noteholders and bondholders will eventually be repaid in full, they
are treated equally under the Moratorium Act. Flushing One, 84 Misc. 2d 976, -, 379
N.Y.S.2d 978, 985-86 (1975). Neither of these issues resurfaced in the appellate division or
court of appeals decisions.
C. Flushing Two
When the appellate division reviewed the decision of the supreme
court, 30 it introduced a new issue to the controversy: the "traditional"
"distinction drawn between the obligation of a contract and the remedies
available to enforce that obligation.''31 According to this distinction, if
the modification of the remedy is reasonable, 32 and is thereby impaired,33
the contract impairment clause of the Constitution has been satisfied.34
The court, nevertheless, made no effort to define the distinction between
"modification" and unconstitutional impairment; 35 rather, each case was
held to require individual scrutiny, and upon such scrutiny the EMA was
found to allow a "mere extension of time." This was not an unlawful
interference with a contractual obligation.36
The remainder of the opinion echoes the arguments of Flushing
One. The appellate division ruled on the federal issue by deciding that
"implicit in every contract or obligation is the gloss of existing laws as
well as the gloss of essential sovereign powers reposed in the state.'' 37 No
mention appears of the limited demands of the contract clause nor of the
states' power of avoidance. The state law issue received a more cursory
dismissal: "As to the alleged violation of our New York State Constitu-
tion . . . we merely note that the mandate of these sections has not been
violated by the EMA legislation." 3"
D. Flushing Three and the Incongruities of the
Flushing Bank Decisions
The New York Court of Appeals, 39 reviewing the decision in
Flushing One ° and Flushing Two, seized upon an issue that both lower
courts avoided: the requirements of the New York Constitution. The
majority opinion characterized the avoidance as conspicuous and unwar-
30. Flushing Two, 52 App. Div. 2d 84, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1976).
31. Flushing Two, 52 App. Div. 2d 84, 87, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764, 767 (1976).
32. Id.
33. "It is competent for the states to change the form of the remedy, or to modify it
otherwise, as they may see fit, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is
thereby impaired." Id., quoting Van Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535,553
(1866).
34. "The reasonableness of the modification of the remedy must be left to the
judgment and discretion of the legislature, which discretion should not be disturbed absent
palpable error." Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 52 App. Div. 2d 84,87, 382
N.Y.S.2d 764, - (1976). See also, Antori v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 775 (1882).
We ought never to overrule the decision of the legislative department of the
government, unless a palpable error has been committed. If a state of facts could
exist that would justify the change in a remedy which has been made, we must
presume it did exist, and that the law was passed on that account.
35. Traditionally, no such effort has been made. See, e.g., Jackson v. Lamphire, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830).
36. Flushing Two, 52 App. Div. 2d 84, 88, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764, 767 (1976).
37. Id., 382 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
38. Id., 382 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (emphasis supplied).
39. Flushing Three, 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
40. Flushing One, 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1976).
41. Flushing Two, 52 App. Div. 2d 84, 382 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1976).
ranted, noting that it was "not without significance that although special
term [of the Supreme Court] and the Appellate Division treated the many
federal constitutional issues involved neither offered any analysis to
overcome the crux of the case-the faith and credit clause and its
implications."-42 The court of appeals, unlike the two lower courts,
decided the state issues and found a violation of the New York Constitu-
tion. They thus declared that "the federal questions need not be
reached." 
43
Following a review of the facts and a discussion of state constitution-
al history the court defined the dual obligations involved in a pledge of
"faith and credit." First, the pledge of "faith" obligates a city to pay the
amount owed according to the terms of the instrument. Second, the
pledge of "credit" requires that the borrower "use in good faith the city's
general revenue powers to produce sufficient funds to pay the principal
and interest of the obligation as it becomes due."I This constitutional
definition of faith and credit is firm and supported by judicial comment,
45
as well as by the understanding of the financial community. Examination
of the records of the New York constitutional convention evinces no
intent to imbue the words with a contrary meaning.' The constitutional
mandate is a simple one, said the majority, and although "neither life nor
law is . . . easy,"-47 it must be followed.
The City argued that notwithstanding the simplicity of the constitu-
tional provision, the Act was justifiable on five grounds. First, as the
appellate division had agreed, the New York Constitution requires only a
pledge of faith and credit, not performance of the promise. The court
pointed out, however, that the pledge becomes meaningless and loses all
value if performance can be so easily avoided. 4" The requirement of the
42. Flushing Three, 40 N.Y.S.2d 731, -, 358 N.E.2d 848, 853, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22, 28
(1976).
43. Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 850, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 40. Moreover, it was decided that the
theory of the United States Supreme Court cases "cast little light on the state constitutional
issues involved." Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 854, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22, 28.
44. Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 851, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 24. The court distinguished revenue
bonds, which give the creditors the right to seek payment only from the proceeds of a
certain municipal facility, i.e., a sewer system or water authority.
45. See, e.g., State v. City of Lakeland, 154 Fla. 137, 16 So. 2d 924 (1943).
46. [T]he term "faith and credit" in its context [within the New York
Constitution] is not qualified in any way and the records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1938 reveal no analysis of the words, let alone any suggestion of a
departure from their evident meaning.
Flushing Three, 40 N.Y.2d 731, -, 358 N.E.2d 848, 851, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1976).
47. Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 854, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
48. The constitutional requirement of a pledge of the city's faith and credit is not
satisfied merely by engraving a statement of the pledge in the text of the obliga-
tion. The last is a strange argument made by respondents. It is difficult to
understand the financial value of such a commitment as contrasted with a "mor-
al" obligation wisely prohibited by the constitution for municipalities. . . . In-
stead by any test, whether based on realism or sensibility, the city is constitution-
ally obligated to pay and to use in good faith its revenue powers to produce funds
to pay the principal and interest.
Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
constitution is not "exhausted when the indebtedness is incurred";
49
rather, the constitutional demand of the pledge impacts upon the antici-
pated payment of that promise.
5 °
Second, the City applied the reasoning of the appellate division
regarding the federal contract clause to the state faith and credit clause.
The City argued that the pledge stands intact, only the remedies available
thereunder have been changed. Semantic niceties aside, however, "[i]t is
elementary that denial of a remedy is a denial of the right.""' If creditors
cannot demand performance, the pledge is illusory.
Third, the public policy of the Act is so enormous, argued the City,
that it is the responsibility of the judiciary to acquiesce in the legislative
conscience. The court, however, found no policy supportive of an unjus-
tified shift of the burden from an insolvent treasury to innocent creditors.
The City's troubles are not traceable to the demands of the creditors;
rather, "what has happened is those responsible have made an expedient
selection of the temporary noteholders to bear an extraordinary bur-
den." 52 Even had the policy been more compelling, the court realized
that the duty of a judiciary is to check the legislature and not to obey it
blindly.53 Similarly, the reason for a constitution is to generate stability
and not to yield to inconvenience.
5 4
Next, the City reasoned that the police power of the sovereign
bolsters the validity of the Moratorium Act. The court termed this argu-
ment one "of last recourse." 55 Such a power can override mere statutes
but "is not a higher law which transcends constitutions as well.' '56
Furthermore, the constitution itself prohibits such subordination by giv-
ing the creditors a specific remedy against a defaulting municipality.
57
49. Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 853, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
50. "The only practical significance of a pledge of faith and credit with respect to an
indebtedness must be in relation to its payment here on earth and on its due day." Td. at-,
358 N.E.2d at 853-54, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
51. Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
52. Id.
53. "The notes in suit provided that the city pledged its faith and credit to pay the
notes and to pay them punctually when due. . . .A neutral court worthy of its status
cannot do less than hold what is so evident." Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 855, 390 N.Y.S.2d at
29.
54. "The clause and the constitutional mandate have no offices except when their
enforcement is inconvenient." Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 855, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 29. The court
also noted that "[tihe constitutional prescription of a pledge of faith and credit is designed
.. .to protect rights vulnerable in the event of dire economic circumstances." Id. at -,
358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S. at 26.
55. Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 853, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
56. Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 854, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
57. 1d. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 853, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 27. This remedy appears at N.Y.
CONST. art. 8, § 2 wherein it is provided that
If at any time the respective appropriating authorities shall fail to make such
appropriations [to repay general obligations], a sufficient sum shall be set apart
from the first revenues thereafter received and shall be applied to such purposes.
The fiscal officer of any . . .city . . .may be required to set apart and apply
such revenues as aforesaid at the suit of any holder of obligations issued for any
such indebtedness.
Finally, the City pointed to the Emergency Clause of the New York
Constitution that provides the legislature with power to act "notwith-
standing any other provision" of the constitution during periods of
emergency if, and only if, such extraordinary action becomes crucial to
the "continuity of government operations. 5 8 The court found this clause
inapposite, applicable only to situations involving nuclear holocaust.59
The most striking feature of the high court's majority opinion is its
failure to address the issues decided by the two lower courts. The
supreme court chose to ignore the state issue, with a seemingly naive
expectation that it would remain dormant. The court of appeals, on the
other hand, chose to ignore the thoughts of the lower court, declaring the
federal constitutional principals announced therein inapplicable to the
case. The dissent from the court of appeals decision made some attempt
to coalesce these divergent theories, but came no closer than the question-
able conclusion that the faith and credit clause of the New York State
Constitution was merely one facet of the federal prohibition of contract
impairment.' Thus, maintained the lone dissenter, the United States
Supreme Court cases cited by the New York Supreme Court and the
appellate division present binding authority for the case at bar.
61
Clearly, the diversity in the opinions could have been avoided and
greater understanding of the controversy obtained had the courts ad-
dressed the underlying question instead of its superficial manifestations.
That basic question is whether, in a situation in which strict adherence to
constitutional principles, state or federal, 62 will result in grave insecurity
to the communal body, and indeed perhaps disintegration of the political
unit, 63 the police power of the state becomes pre-eminent and allows
legislation which is technically at variance with constitutional mandates.
58. N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 25.
59. - N.Y.2d at -, 358 N.E.2d at 854, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
60. Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 864, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 38 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
61. Id., 358 N.E.2d at 864, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 38 (Cooke, J., dissenting). Judge Cooke
also repeated many of the theories espoused by the Flushing One and Flushing Two courts,
and argued strenuously for an expansive reading of the emergency clause of the New York
Constitution.
62. The argument to follow will focus on a state's ability to disobey the United States
Constitution. It should be noted, however, that if such ability is affirmed, the ability of a
state to disobey its own constitution is far more certain. The federal constitution binds one
state in compact with the others. A state's own constitution binds only the one sovereign
entity. It has become a political axiom that a state cannot bind itself not to exert its police
power. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629 (1935).
63. Significantly, none of the Flushing opinions challenge the legislature's findings of
fact, although those findings do indeed bespeak a threat that the city could cease to exist as
an operable political unit. The legislature had found
an imminent danger that the City of New York will be unable. . . even to provide
those basic services essential to the health, safety, and welfare of its inhabitants
and the continuation of orderly government in the city. . . .The preservation of
the city [is a] . . .matter of imperative state concern.
1975 N.Y. Laws, Ex. Sess., c. 874, § 1. In his dissent to Flushing Three Judge Cooke points
out that "[a] city of eight million, deprived of even the most basic of services, would be a
terrible tragedy, nothing short of a disaster and an emergency dire and critical in nature."
Flushing Three, 40 N.Y.S.2d 731, -, 358 N.E.2d 848, 866, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22, 41 (1976). The
II. The Pre-eminence of the State
Of all of the courts to consider the case, the court of appeals came
closest to recognizing this question by concluding that "[e]mergencies
and the police power, although they may modify their applications, do
not suspend constitutional principles.' 64 The oft quoted language of the
United States Supreme Court in Home Building and Loan Association v.
Bansdel 65 supports the court's position for constitutional supremacy:
Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not in-
crease granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions
imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was
adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to
the federal government and its limitations of the power of the
states were determined in the light of emergency and they are
not altered by emergency. What power was this granted and
what limitations were thus imposed are questions which have
always been and will always be the subject of close examination
under our constitutional system.
Nevertheless, the declaration that constitutional pre-eminence is a ques-
tion for constitutional analysis suffers from circular reasoning, and ig-
nores the premise that any constitution is created to fulfill the needs of the
governed.67
If the political order and the adopted constitution cannot co-exist, the
determination as to which should fall devolves to a question of which can
have an independent vitality. Stated differently, can either one survive
without the other?
If the community collapses because of the constitution, then the
community of will that constitutes sovereignty must follow. 68 All that
remains as a repository for the'sovereign will is the constitution itself, and
majority of the court of appeals conceded that Judge Cooke's portrait of the consequences
was a "correct one." Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 854, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
64. Id. at -, 358 N.E.2d at 855, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 29. The lack of careful demarcation
between "modification" and "suspension," however, makes this a confusing concession. It
is more confusing because it is unnecessary to the theory of the court's decision. If the
police power cannot transcend constitutions, why then allow that it can modify their
principals? Since the instant statute does nothing more than delay payment, the argument
becomes possible that only a modification of the "faith and credit" pledge is necessary to
affirm the Act's validity. The city's "credit" remains in force, only the "faith" portion of
the pledge need be relaxed from a promise to pay punctually to a promise to pay when
possible.
65. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
66. Id. at 425.
67. It seems clear that if obedience to any constitution will lead to the disruption of the
state, disobedience becomes mandatory. The theoretical atmosphere out of which American
Federalism sprang denotes the intent of the founders that no governmental system should
become self-justifying:
To secure [the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness] governments
are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed; . . . whenever any form of government becomes destructive of those
ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it.
Declaration of Independence of the United States of America.
68. The political order contemplated by the founders was the Rousseauian ideal of
popular sovereignty in which the rights of the sovereign, the "general will" of the governed,
repose in the people.
the conclusion becomes inescapable that the document has ceased to
regulate society but has instead become its substitute. The primary pur-
pose of constitutional government, therefore, must be the maintenance of
society. To the extent that the political unit and the constitution cannot
co-exist, the constitution must yield. The judicial recognition that "al-
though an emergency may not call into life a power which has never
lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a
living power already enjoyed" 69 combines with the truism that the social
order exists for the communal protection to reach the same conclusion.
The legislature, therefore, having become the situs for the sovereign
power of police, has as its first responsibility the provision of basic
societal needs: health, welfare, and security. No constitution can be
suffered to oppose this responsibility.
Applying this theory to the court of appeals' decision in Flushing
Three, it is apparent that although the appellant bank prevailed in the
decision, the victory may be illusory. The court tempered its ruling that
the EMA was unconstitutional with the observation that,
[i]n order to minimize market and government disruptions
which might ensue it would be injudicious at this time to allow
the extraordinary remedies in the nature of injunction and
peremptory mandamus sought by plaintiff. . . .It would serve
neither the plaintiff nor the people of the city of New York
precipitately to invoke instant judicial remedies which might
give the city no choice except to proceed into bankruptcy.
70
Thus, although evidently paying lip service to the supremacy of constitu-
tional rule, the court of appeals, by failing to order immediate payment,
acquiesced to the exertion of emergency power, at least to a degree. If the
police power cannot suppress constitutional mandates, as the court so
unequivocally maintained, then the delay has no theoretical foundation.
III. Conclusion
It must be recognized that upon certain circumstances emergencies
that threaten the survival of a government may require suspension of
constitutional law. While there is potential for abuse inherent in this rule,
the question of its applicability should never arise unless the emergency is
so grave that either the existing state or the constitution must yield. The
greatest danger lies in determining when such circumstances exist. In a
case such as that presented in Flushing Bank, however, all judges agreed
with the legislative finding of emergency. There should, therefore, have
been an admission that emergency powers were required. The failure to
so admit and the concurrent failure to provide a normal remedy cloud the
courts' resolution of the issues. In an age when more municipalities are
approaching insolvency, the states, like New York, will be forced into
69. Wilson v. New York, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1916).
70. Flushing Three, 40 N.Y.2d 731, -, 358 N.E.2d 848, 855, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22, 28
(1976).
increasing intervention. The federal contract clause does not prevent such
intervention, that much is clear. Nonetheless, the courts will no doubt see
much litigation in the states' attempts at municipal salvation, and will be
called upon to squarely resolve the issues skirted by the Flushing Bank
decisions. Declarations of constitutional niceties that do not conform with
judicial reluctance to suspend municipal services and functions will do
little to clarify the reasonable expectations of citizens, cities, or creditors.
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